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In the wake of the war in Indochina, U.S. citizens began to reassess
their country's role in world affairs. Troubled by their own government's
violence,' they questioned its support of violent governments elsewhere.2
Too frequently, the United States was providing aid to governments that
violated fundamental human rights. In the 1970s, Congress enacted sev-
eral statutes designed to curtail this practice; by 1980, a comprehensive
scheme of human rights legislation was in force. This legislation prohib-
ited military sales and assistance,3 development assistance,4 and
favorable votes for certain multilateral loans5 to countries whose govern-
ments engage in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internation-
ally recognized human rights."'6 In addition, Congress enacted human
rights legislation directed at specific countries.
In 1977, Guatemala was the subject of country-specific human rights
legislation that terminated one form of military assistance. 7 The country
also came within the purview of the general human rights statutes, as
its record of human rights abuse was abysmal, among the worst in the
hemisphere.8  Government-sponsored political murder, torture,
disappearances, and other cruelties have plagued the lives of
t J.D. Candidates, Yale Law School. We thank Beth Benton, Betsy Cavendish, and
Linda Sproul for their generous help.
1. See P. SLATER, THE PURSUIT OF LONELINESS: AMERICAN CULTURE AT THE BREAK-
ING POINT 29 (1970) ("The past few years in America have seen the gradual disintegration of
the illusion that we are not a violent people.").
2. For a critical view of U.S. policy, see Chomsky & Herman, The United States versus
Human Rights in the Third World, MONTHLY REV., July-Aug. 1977, at 44 ("After the horrors
of Indochina, some dramatic initiatives were needed to reconstruct the image of American
benevolence.").
3. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 502B, 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
4. Id. § 116, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
5. International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 § 701, 22 U.S.C. § 262d (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
6. E.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 502B, 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2).
7. Section 503B of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of
1978 prohibited the use of funds "to provide foreign military credit sales to the Governments
of Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala." Pub. L. No. 95-148, § 503B, 91 Stat.
1230, 1239 (1977). See infra note 117.
8. AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE, CIVIL PATROLS IN GUATEMALA 1 (1986) [hereinafter
CIVIL PATROLS IN GUATEMALA]; see also Black, Under the Gun, NACLA REPORT ON THE
AMERICAS, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 11.
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Guatemalans for over 30 years. During the early 1980s alone, an esti-
mated 36,000 to 72,000 Guatemalan adults were killed.9 Few in this
country of eight million have not lost a brother or sister, a parent or
child.
The U.S. government bears much responsibility for these tragedies. In
1954, the United States directed the overthrow of the reformist govern-
ment of President Jacobo Arbenz.'0 Since then, the United States has
supported, always with money1 and often with guns, 12 a series of brutal
military regimes. 13 During the Reagan years, the Administration has
frequently evaded Congress' human rights restrictions, and Guatemala
has suffered no shortage of military materiel.
Thus it was with utmost interest that human rights advocates wit-
nessed the inauguration of a civilian president, Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo,
in January 1986. Five months earlier, encouraged by prospects of demo-
cratic reform and civilian rule,14 Congress had enacted new legislation on
Guatemala-section 703 of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act (ISDCA)I5 -lifting the prohibition on military aid if
9. Black, supra note 8, at 11 (citing a Guatemalan government census). The figure was
derived by counting orphans; the number of murdered children is unknown.
10. See generally S. SCHLESINGER & S. KINZER, BIIrER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA (1983).
11. Even after Congress prohibited the extension of credit for military sales in 1977, see
supra note 7, Guatemala continued to receive U.S. development assistance. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, NAT'L SECURITY AND INT'L AFFAIRS Div., MILITARY SALES: THE
UNITED STATES CONTINUING MUNITION SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH GUATEMALA 30
(1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; see also T. BARRY, GUATEMALA: THE POLITICS OF
COUNTERINSURGENCY 42 (1986).
12. See infra Parts II and III.
13. See generally 2 M. MCCLINTOCK, THE AMERICAN CONNECTION: STATE TERROR
AND POPULAR RESISTANCE IN GUATEMALA (1985); J. HANDY, GIFT OF THE DEVIL: A
HISTORY OF GUATEMALA (1984).
14. Several parties had participated in the July 1, 1984 elections for a Constituent Assem-
bly, which was responsible for drafting a constitution and habeas corpus laws. Developments
in Guatemala and U.S. Options: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, 43 (1985) (statement of
Georges A. Fauriol, Senior Fellow, Caribbean Basin Program, Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, Georgetown University). Presidential elections were held on November 3,
1985. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP AND THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON
LATIN AMERICA, THE 1985 GUATEMALAN ELECTIONS: WILL THE MILITARY RELINQUISH
POWER? (1985) [hereinafter GUATEMALAN ELECTIONS]. Cerezo was elected in a run-off elec-
tion held on December 8, 1985. NETWORK IN SOLIDARITY WITH GUATEMALA, UNDER-
STANDING TODAY'S GUATEMALA (1986) [hereinafter TODAY'S GUATEMALA].
15. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 703, 99 Stat. 190, 239-41 (1985). Section 703(a) reads as follows:
(a) Conditions on Military Assistance and Sales. -For fiscal years 1986 and 1987,
assistance may be provided for Guatemala under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to grant military assistance) and sales may be made and
financing may be provided for Guatemala under the Arms Export Control Act (relating
to foreign military sales) only if the President makes the following certifications to the
Congress:
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certain conditions were met. Under the legislation, military assistance
grants and military sales and credits would be provided to Guatemala in
fiscal years 1986 and 1987 only if the President certified that "an elected
civilian government is in power in Guatemala," and that "the Govern-
ment of Guatemala made demonstrated progress during the preceding
year" in "achieving control over its military and security forces," in elim-
inating human rights abuses, and in respecting the human rights of the
indigenous Indian population.
16
Sadly, the legislation has not served its purpose. In spite of the elec-
tion and inauguration of a civilian president, grievous human rights vio-
lations, attributable to the army, continue to terrorize the Guatemalan
people. At the same time, U.S. military aid has increased. In June 1986
Secretary of State George Shultz, on behalf of the President, certified to
Congress that the conditions of section 703 had been met.17 That year,
the United States delivered an estimated $109.5 million in economic and
military assistance to Guatemala.18 The Administration submitted a sec-
ond certification in December 1986,19 and Congress allocated another
$117.6 million for fiscal year 1987.20 The President has requested $144.6
million for fiscal years 1988 and 1989.21
(1) For fiscal year 1986, an elected civilian government is in power in Guatemala and
has submitted a formal written request to the United States for the assistance, sales, or
financing to be provided.
(2) For both fiscal years 1986 and 1987, the Government of Guatemala made demon-
strated progress during the preceding year-
(A) in achieving control over its military and security forces,
(B) toward eliminating kidnappings and disappearances, forced recruitment into the
civil defense patrols, and other abuses by such forces of internationally recognized human
rights, and
(C) in respecting the internationally recognized human rights of its indigenous Indian
population.
16. Id. International Military and Education Training (IMET) is not covered by the sec-
tion 703 restrictions. Section 703(b) requires that U.S.-provided construction equipment, mo-
bile medical facilities and related training be limited to "programs that will directly assist the
poor." Subsection (c) prohibits the use of U.S. funds for "the procurement by Guatemala of
any weapons or ammunition." Subsection (e) prohibits the use of U.S. development assistance
funds and economic support funds for Guatemala's rural resettlement program. See infra note
164.
17. Certification to Authorize Military Assistance and Sales for Guatemala, 51 Fed. Reg.
24,467 (1986).
18. 1987 AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY TABLES 13.
19. Certification to Authorize Military Assistance and Sales for Guatemala, 51 Fed. Reg.
46,971 (1986).
20. Stix, Reagan Requests Increased Aid for Guatemala, REP. ON GUATEMALA, Mar.-Apr.
1987, at 15. Fiscal year 1987 runs from October 1, 1986 to September 30, 1987.
21. Id. However, in April, the House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended cutting
this figure by $23 million. Stix, House Committee Requests 121.5 Million in Aid to Guatemala,
REP. ON GUATEMALA, May-June 1987, at 14. On December 10, 1987, the House passed a
foreign aid authorization bill for fiscal years 1988 and 1989. H.R. 3100, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987). The Senate version was referred to the full Senate by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Yale Journal of International Law
The Reagan Administration thus continues to undermine prospects for
an end to human rights abuses in Guatemala. But Congress must share
responsibility with the Executive. By emphasizing mere progress in elim-
inating human rights abuses, section 703's certification provision weak-
ens the blanket prohibition on military aid to human rights violators
imposed by earlier statutes.22 Moreover, the certification process is easily
manipulated by the Executive, and leaves Congress with few effective
means of oversight. So long as the Executive complies with the proce-
dural requirements of the statute, the authorization of military assistance
for Guatemala is a fait accompli.23 With these substantive and proce-
dural innovations, Congress has forsaken the principles that inspired the
early legislation, and has acquiesced in the demise of a serious human
rights policy.
Using Guatemala as a case study, this Comment explores the interac-
tion of the Executive and Congress in implementing human rights legis-
lation. Part I assesses the constitutionality of human rights legislation as
a legitimate constraint on executive power in foreign affairs. Part II ana-
lyzes section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the statute
prohibiting military aid to human rights violators, and offers evidence of
the Reagan Administration's evasions of the provision as applied to Gua-
temala. Part III focuses on the 1985 legislation and the State Depart-
ment's subsequent certification. By contrasting the certification's
language with current conditions in Guatemala, Part III demonstrates
that the Executive has continued to undermine congressional intent. Fi-
nally, the Conclusion offers suggestions as to how Congress can and
must, if it takes seriously its commitment to human rights, regain its
control.
I. The Constitutionality of Human Rights Legislation
In conditioning military aid to foreign countries on their respect for
human rights, Congress treads in an area of constitutional uncertainty.
Relations in April 1987. S. 1274, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). At this writing, no action has
been taken on this bill.
22. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2). In contrast, development and economic assistance may be fur-
nished "to any country with respect to which the President finds that such a significant im-
provement in its human rights record has occurred as to warrant lifting the prohibition on
furnishing such assistance in the national interest of the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 2304(e).
Under the terms of this provision, non-military aid arguably may be furnished to a country
whose government continues to engage in gross violations of human rights.
23. After authorizing funds for foreign assistance, however, Congress must still pass an
appropriations bill before the Executive may use the funds. At the appropriations stage, Con-
gress has the power to add a provision prohibiting military assistance to Guatemala, but imple-
menting this power would be difficult. See infra text following note 128.
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The U.S. Constitution leaves open to dispute which branch of the
government is to direct the course of foreign policy.24 The enumerated
powers of the President in this area are few: the commander in chief
power,25 the power to receive ambassadors, 26 and (with the advice and
consent of the Senate) the power to make treaties and appoint ambassa-
dors and other officers of the United States.27 The President also is
charged with exercising the "executive Power" 28 and is required to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 29 Case law and executive
practice have added an unenumerated "foreign affairs" or "sole organ"
30
power as well, although its content is far from clear.
31
The enumerated powers of Congress relating to foreign affairs include
the power to declare war, 32 to establish, support and regulate the armed
forces, 33 to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, 34 and to
regulate foreign commerce. 35 More generally, the Constitution vests in
Congress the authority to provide "for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States."'36 In addition, Congress derives implied
24. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 32 (1972):
As they have evolved, the foreign relations powers appear not so much "separated" as
fissured, along jagged lines indifferent to classical categories of governmental power:
some powers and functions belong to the President, some to Congress, some to the Presi-
dent-and-Senate; some can be exercised by either the President or the Congress, some
require the joint authority of both. Irregular, uncertain division renders claims of usurpa-
tion more difficult to establish and the courts have not been available to adjudicate them.
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
26. Id. § 3.
27. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
28. Id. § 1, cl. 1.
29. Id. § 3.
30. The phrase is from John Marshall, speaking in the House of Representatives in 1799 in
favor of President John Adams's decision, pursuant to a treaty, to extradite without judicial
process a person charged with murder by Great Britain. 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 613
(1800), discussed in Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv.
1, 15-17 (1972). The "sole organ" language, with a gloss unintended by Marshall, has been oft
repeated, most notably in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936).
31. See L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 45-50.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
33. Id. cl. 12-14.
34. Id. cl. 10.
35. Id. cl. 3.
36. Id. cl. 1. In addition, Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 establishes that "No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." Thus the
Constitution both grants a "spending power" to Congress and denies this power to the Execu-
tive absent congressional authorization.
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powers from the "necessary and proper" clause,3 7 as well as from an
unenumerated congressional "foreign affairs" power.
38
Undoubtedly Congress has the authority, under the foreign commerce
power, to regulate sales of weapons and technology to foreign countries.
Equally clear, the disbursement of foreign aid is a function of the spend-
ing power of Congress. 3 9 It does not follow, however, that Congress may
exercise these powers in any way it chooses. The powers are exclusive, in
that no other branch on its own authority may spend for the general
welfare or regulate foreign commerce, and they are unquestionably
broad, but they are not without limits.
Even in the exercise of its exclusive powers, Congress is bound by the
Constitution, and it cannot violate constitutional constraints on federal
authority. Congress could not, for example, appropriate funds to estab-
lish an official religion. It could not pay government employees dispa-
rately according to their race. Nor could it withhold salaries to certain
federal employees because it believes they are "subversives."
'40
Other limits on Congress, less clear perhaps, derive from the separa-
tion of federal powers,41 and it is these limits that may be implicated in
Congress' control over foreign aid and arms sales. To what extent do the
powers vested by the Constitution in the Executive Branch constrain
Congress' discretion to spend for the general welfare and to regulate
commerce among foreign nations? While the Supreme Court has never
37. Id. cl. 18 (authorizing Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ....").
38. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603
(1889) (holding that Congress could invoke powers "incident of every independent nation" to
exclude aliens).
39. Congress' article I power to spend for the general welfare has been interpreted broadly.
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (the spending power is "not limited by the
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution"); United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950) (the spending power is limited only in that Congress must
act for the common benefit).
40. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946), the Supreme Court held invalid,
under Article III, a provision in an appropriations act that forbade the payment of federal
salaries to three named government employees. The provision fell "precisely within the cate-
gory of congressional action which the Constitution barred by providing that 'No Bill of At-
tainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed'." Id.
41. Congress cannot legislate so as to direct the judiciary to reach a particular outcome in
a case. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
The separation-of-powers doctrine also limits the range of procedural devices available to
Congress. For example, most assistance to countries provided under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 is subject to termination by concurrent resolution. 22 U.S.C. § 2367 (1982). This
procedure would allow majorities of the two Houses of Congress to override an executive
decision, and is therefore a form of legislative veto. In I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional another type of legislative veto, the one-House veto.
The Court's rationale was broad-the legislative veto provision in the challenged statute was
held to violate, inter alia, the presentment clause of article I, Section 7-and likely invalidates
the two-House vetoes contained in the Foreign Assistance Act.
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struck down any use of the spending power as an infringement upon ex-
ecutive authority,42 certain limits must exist. For example, in exercising
its spending power, Congress cannot nullify a power that belongs exclu-
sively to the Executive. In particular, it is unlikely that Congress could
refuse to appropriate money for the salary of an ambassador or for the
maintenance of an embassy. Congressional action of this sort would un-
abashedly intrude on the President's exclusive appointment and recogni-
tion powers.
43
Human rights restrictions on foreign aid and trade do conflict with the
President's recognition power and its emanations. Directing the Presi-
dent to declare a country a gross violator of human rights44 would cer-
tainly affect, and might well jeopardize, U.S. relations with that country.
To put this argument at its strongest, a congressional human rights pol-
icy could result in a severance of diplomatic relations. But this situation
is different from a decision by Congress to cut off all funds for an em-
bassy. The latter is a direct nullification of the President's power to es-
tablish diplomatic relations; the former is a legitimate legislative policy-
to avoid funding governments that deny their citizens fundamental
human rights-that might result in the deterioration of diplomatic rela-
tions.45 As Louis Henkin has written:
It has been argued that increasingly foreign policy takes the form of spend-
ing programs; that [aid programs] in particular are ... essential indicia of
friendly relations with many countries; that decisions as to aid are therefore
properly the President's responsibility and Congress can no more refuse the
President appropriations for foreign assistance than for maintaining' an
embassy.
Here the argument for Congressional independence is surely stronger.
Foreign assistance seems not merely an appropriation of funds to imple-'
ment policies which are primarily the President's responsibility but a form
of spending for the general welfare of the United States, and it is difficult to
42. Franck & Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law After the
Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 944 (1985).
43. That exclusive executive control over embassies derives from these powers is not obvi-
ous from the constitutional text. The power has become well established over time, however.
"It is no longer questioned that the President does not merely perform the ceremony of receiv-
ing foreign ambassadors but also determines whether the United States should recognize or
refuse to recognize foreign governments and whether to maintain or terminate relations with
them." L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 47.
44. None of the human rights statutes requires such a declaration, and presidents have
complied with the statutory requirements without making formal declarations. Whether or
not the Executive makes a formal declaration, however, countries may indeed take offense, as
did Guatemala in 1977. See infra note 117.
45. Admittedly, the effect on the recognition power is a matter of degree. But in this area
constitutional rules turn on matters of degree: How directly and pervasively does a congres-
sional act interfere with an exclusive power of the President?
117
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accept that the President should command a power expressly conferred
upon Congress.
46
Champions of executive autonomy may also argue that human rights
restrictions interfere with the "sole organ" power of the President, or, as
Justice Sutherland wrote in Curtiss-Wright, the power of "the President
alone . . . to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. ' 47 This
doctrine has doubtful merit as a statement of constitutional principle.
48
However, even if the President does possess a "sole organ" power requir-
ing "one voice" in foreign affairs, it does not follow that Congress should
be denied a role in shaping the content of that voice.49 In the case of
46. L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 108.
47. 299 U.S. at 319. Justice Sutherland wrote broadly, seeming to confer unconstrained,
even extra-constitutional, power on the President. The actual holding of the case was nar-
rower, validating President Franklin Roosevelt's decision, pursuant to an explicit delegation of
power from Congress, to ban arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay. The question for decision
concerned only the power of Congress to delegate to the President its authority over foreign
arms sales.
Justice Sutherland argued that
since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not
have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the
United States from some other source [than the Constitution]. . . . It results that the
investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.
Id. at 316. The historical premise upon which Justice Sutherland built his theory has been
much criticized. See L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 289 & n. 10; Levitan, The Foreign Relations
Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Berger, supra
note 30, at 26-33 and sources cited therein.
In any event, the "extra-constitutional" theory of Curtiss-Wright seems to have been cast
aside by Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579
(1952). Justice Black, writing for the majority, made no reference to Curtiss-Wright, and
wrote simply: "The President's power, if any, to issue the order [directing the Secretary of
Commerce to take possession of the steel mills] must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself." Id. at 585. In his famous concurrence in Youngstown, Justice
Jackson discussed Curtiss-Wright in a footnote, stating that it "recognized internal and exter-
nal affairs as being in separate categories, and held that the strict limitation upon congressional
delegations of power to the President over internal affairs did not apply with respect to delega-
tions of power in external affairs." Id. at 635 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring). Despite Suther-
land's wandering dicta, Curtiss-Wright was really about congressional power. To cite Curtiss-
Wright as authority for limiting congressional power in foreign affairs is to stand the case on
its head.
48. Undoubtedly the President speaking alone makes for efficient practice, but, as the
Court wrote in another context, "[T]he Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency."
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
49. Reacting to the exclusion of Congress by the Executive in its Iran-Contra affair, the
congressional committees investigating the affair wrote:
The Constitution of the United States gives important powers to both the President and
the Congress in the making of foreign policy. The President is the principal architect of
foreign policy in consultation with the Congress. The policies of the United States cannot
succeed unless the President and the Congress work together.
HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN & SEN-
ATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN
OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1987).
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Guatemala, for instance, direct communication by Congress with the
Guatemalan government might unconstitutionally infringe on the Presi-
dent's "sole organ" power.50 But Congress is not forbidden from
directing the President to refuse, in his single voice, aid to Guatemala. If
any content can be imputed to the "sole organ" power of the President, it
cannot utterly disempower Congress from acting under its express con-
stitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce and provide for the
common defense and general welfare. 51
Congress and the President are partners in the making of foreign pol-
icy, and while each has exclusive powers, they frequently occupy the
same terrain. The actions of one affect the actions of the other, and
human rights legislation is no exception. It could not be otherwise, with-
out sacrificing the principles of a constitutional scheme that places great
value on a system of checks and balances.
Congress, therefore, has the constitutional power to enact human
rights restrictions on foreign aid and trade. Because, under Article II,
the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"
52 it
is unconstitutional for the President not to enforce human rights legisla-
tion. However, the courts are loath to adjudicate foreign policy disputes
between Congress and the President, labeling such disputes nonjusticia-
ble political questions 53 or denying standing to the litigants. 54 In the
50. This possibility is not far-fetched. At this writing, controversy builds over House
Speaker Jim Wright's private meeting with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. See New
Haven Register, Nov. 17, 1987, at Al, col. 2 (noting "[a]ngry charges... over whether Wright
overstepped his bounds and usurped the president's foreign policy role").
51. See L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 65 ("Even the broadest theories [of the President's
powers in foreign affairs] ... accept that there are major limitations on the President implied in
or flowing from grants of power to Congress ... .
52. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
53. The contour of the political question doctrine in the foreign affairs context is unsettled
in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), a plurality of
four justices relied on the doctrine to decline review of President Carter's termination of a
treaty with Taiwan. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, broadly declared that "this
case is 'political' and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President
in the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the
Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President." Id. at 1002 (plurality opinion).
Justice Powell, while concurring in the dismissal of the case, strongly disagreed with the
plurality's analysis. Even on Powell's narrower understanding of the political question doc-
trine, however, a challenge to an executive certification of human rights conditions would
likely fail because "resolution of the question [would] demand that a court move beyond areas
of judicial expertise," or because "prudential considerations counsel against judicial interven-
tion." Id. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).
The doctrine has been more visible in the lower federal courts. See, eg., Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973) (whether President's expansion of Indochina
War into Cambodia was "basic change in the war," thereby requiring congressional approval,
was beyond judicial competence). Recent cases, however, cast doubt on the doctrine's vitality.
See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) (challenge
to Secretary of Commerce's decision not to certify that Japan's whaling practices diminished
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political arena, a successful challenge to executive action is also difficult,
and may require the two-thirds vote necessary to override the President's
veto. Thus, while the Administration has no constitutional authority to
avoid executing human rights statutes, it may often find the political
power to evade their provisions.
II. The General Prohibition on Security Assistance: Congressional
Intent and Executive Practice
A. The Evolution of Section 502B
The early human rights statutes, 55 enacted in the mid-1970s, articu-
lated a new ideal in U.S. foreign policy: The United States would not
effectiveness of international convention held not political question, but rejected on merits);
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1514-15 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting the
doctrine's difficulties), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), aff'd on other grounds, 788 F.2d 762
(D.C. Cir. 1986). See generally Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976).
54. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (private litigants must show that they "suffered some actual or
threatened injury" that "fairly can be traced to the challenged action"); Clark v. United States,
609 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Md. 1985) (taxpayers have no standing to challenge U.S. policy toward
El Salvador and Nicaragua).
Members of Congress obtain standing to sue the Executive only if the executive action in
question nullified their vote. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("the
alleged diminution in congressional influence must amount to a disenfranchisement"), vacated
on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Senator had standing to sue on pocket veto issue "to protect the effectiveness of his
vote"); accord Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Burke v. Barnes, 106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986). The D.C. Circuit panel in Goldwater drew a
distinction
between (1) a diminution in congressional influence resulting from an Executive action
that nullifies a specific congressional vote or opportunity to vote, in an objectively verifia-
ble manner... and (2) a diminution in a legislator's effectiveness, subjectively judged by
him or her, resulting from Executive action withholding information or failing to obey a
statute enacted through the legislator's vote, where the plaintiff-legislator still has power
to act through the legislative process to remedy the alleged abuses ....
617 F.2d at 702. Only the former affords a basis for standing. A congressional suit alleging
failure adequately to enforce the human rights statutes would clearly fall within the latter
category.
But see Riegle v. Federal Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981) (court re-assessing use of congressional standing doctrine, but
nonetheless invoking its "equitable discretion" to deny relief); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d
1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (under court's equitable discre-
tion, relief denied to members of Congress alleging that military aid to El Salvador violated
section 502B of Foreign Assistance Act). See generally Note, The Justiciability of Congres-
sional-Plaintiff Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1982).
55. The evolution of these statutes is traced in some detail in Cohen, Conditioning U.S.
Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 249-56 (1982). See
also Albert, The Undermining of the Legal Standards for Human Rights Violations in United
States Foreign Policy: The Case of "'Improvement" in Guatemala, 14 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 231, 241-44 (1982-83); Nash, Certifying Human Rights: Military Assistance to El Salva-
dor and the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, 14 COLUM.
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support countries, of whatever political and strategic value, that denied
their citizens fundamental human rights. The language of the early legis-
lation, however, was weak. The first statutes to link foreign aid to
human rights standards were advisory only, expressing merely the "sense
of Congress."15 6 Since resistance within the executive branch was high,
the first human rights statutes were "openly disregarded by the Nixon
and Ford administrations. ' 57 Congress was giving advice, not instruc-
tion, and the Executive refused to follow it.
Executive recalcitrance came at a price, and in subsequent years Con-
gress was more thorough in transforming its concerns into policy. Sec-
tion 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,58 the key statute that
links military assistance and sales of military and police equipment to
human rights practices in recipient countries,59 was made mandatory by
amendments in 1976 and 1978. The 1976 amendment removed the
"sense of Congress" language and amended the core of the statute (now
section 502B(a)(2)) to read, "It is further the policy of the United States
that, except under circumstances specified in this section, no security
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 275, 277-84 (1982-83); Comment, Constitutional Impediments to Enforc-
ing Human Rights Legislation: The Case of El Salvador, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 163, 167-76
(1983).
56. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 32, 87 Stat. 714, 733 (1973),
reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note (1982). This first attempt to link aid to human rights
concerns stated: "It is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or
military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or
imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes." Id. While still not mandatory,
legislation enacted the following year broadened the scope "to any government which engages
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without
charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person."
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 46, 88 Stat. 1795, 1815 (1975) (current
version at 22 U.S.C. § 2304). This legislation was the initial version of section 502B of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and is still the core of that celebrated section. See infra notes
64-66 and accompanying text.
57. Cohen, supra note 55, at 249. Executive resistance ran deeper than the presidency.
The bulk of Professor Cohen's article details resistance within the executive branch of the
Carter Administration, particularly within the career foreign service, to implementation of the
human rights statutes, despite "the former President's aggressive public embrace of a human
rights oriented foreign policy." Id.
58. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
59. A related statute, section 660 of the same act, prohibits the use of funds "to provide
training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforce-
ment forces for any foreign government .... 22 U.S.C. § 2420 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Section 660 has been undermined in recent years as the Reagan Administration has evaded the
prohibition by providing police training under the label "antiterrorism assistance," pursuant to
the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2349aa-2(d) (West Supp. 1987). This train-
ing, however, contradicts the intent of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Act, which is to "pro-
vide only specialized training (such as bomb disposal and hostage rescue) to combat
international terrorism .... ARMS CONTROL AND FOREIGN POLICY CAUCUS, POLICE AID
TO CENTRAL AMERICA 13 (1986) (emphasis in original).
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assistance may be provided to any country the government of which en-
gages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights."' 60 While Congress clearly expected the prohibition
to be implemented, 61 the prefatory words, "policy of the United States,"
still permitted the Executive to construe the statute as non-binding.
Thus, in 1978, this language too was deleted to remove any doubts as to
Congress' intent.
62
Section 502B(a)(2) now reads, in part: "Except under circumstances
specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any
country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. ' 63 The act states
that it shall be "a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States
... to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized
human rights by all countries, ' 64 and directs the President "to formulate
and conduct international security assistance programs. . . in a manner
which will promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of
the United States, through such programs, with governments which deny
to their people internationally recognized human rights .... -65
The legislation includes a panoply of procedural requirements. The
Secretary of State is required to "transmit to the Congress, as part of the
60. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329,
§ 301, 90 Stat. 729, 748 (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2304).
61. See Cohen, supra note 55, at 253.
62. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, §§ 6(a)-(d)(1), (e),
10(b)(1), 12(b), 92 Stat. 730, 731, 732, 735, 737 (1978); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1546,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1833, 1874
("the intended effect of this amendment is to substitute for the current policy statement a legal
requirement ... ").
63. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2). In spite of the opening phrase, no exceptions are actually spec-
ified, except that subsections (a)(2) and (c)(1)(C) provide for a waiver of the general prohibi-
tion under "extraordinary circumstances." Id. §§ 2304(a)(2), (c)(1)(C).
The act defines "security assistance" broadly, to include:
(A) assistance under part II (military assistance) or part IV (economic support fund) or
part V (military education and training) or part VI (peacekeeping operations) or part VIII
(antiterrorism assistance) of this subchapter[;] (B) sales of defense articles or services,
extensions of credits (including participations in credits), and guaranties of loans under
the Arms Export Control Act; or (C) any license in effect with respect to the export of
defense articles or defense services to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other
internal security forces of a foreign country under section 38 of the Arms Export Control
Act.
Id. § 2304(d)(2).
The act defines "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" to include
"torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention with-
out charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine
detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security
of person. .. ." Id. § 2304(d)(1).
64. Id. § 2304(a)(1).
65. Id. § 2304(a)(3).
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presentation materials for security assistance programs proposed for each
fiscal year, a full and complete report" on the human rights practices in
prospective recipient countries. 66 The statute also establishes procedures
for Congress to request from the Executive additional information on the
human rights practices in any country. 67 If the Executive does not com-
ply with the request within thirty days, security assistance to the desig-
nated country is automatically terminated. 68 Finally, at any time after
receiving the State Department Country Reports, Congress may "adopt
a joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assist-
ance for such country."'69 Unfortunately, these congressional control de-
vices have not been entirely successful in promoting the goals of the
legislation.
B. The Circumvention of Section 502B
Guatemala never formally came under the purview of section 502B,
since neither Congress nor the Executive officially labeled the country a
66. Id. § 2304(b). Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (prohibiting develop-
ment assistance to countries whose governments engage in a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights) also requires the State Department to file
annual "Country Reports." Id. § 215 ln(d).
67. Id. § 2304(c). Either the Senate or the House of Representatives, by simple resolution,
or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations or the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
may make such a request. Within thirty days, the Secretary of State must issue a statement
setting forth
(A) all the available information about observance of and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedom in that country, and a detailed description of practices by the recipi-'
ent government with respect thereto;
(B) the steps the United States has taken to-
(i) promote respect for and observance of human rights in that country and discourage
any practices which are inimical to internationally recognized human rights, and
(ii) publicly or privately call attention to, and disassociate the United States and any
security assistance provided for such country from, such practices;
(C) whether, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, notwithstanding any such
practices-
(i) extraordinary circumstances exist which necessitate a continuation of security assist-
ance for such country, and, if so, a description of such circumstances and the extent to
which such assistance should be continued (subject to such conditions as Congress may
impose under this section), and
(ii) on all the facts it is in the national interest of the United States to provide such
assistance; and
(D) such other information as such committee or such House may request.
Id. § 2304(c)(1).
68. Id. § 2304(c)(3).
69. Id. § 2304(c)(4)(A). Of course, Congress could pass a joint resolution absent this pro-
vision; however, the statute provides that the resolution be considered in accordance with the
expedited procedures specified in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Con-
trol Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 601(b), 90 Stat. 729, 765-66 (1976). 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304(c)(4)(B).
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gross human rights violator.70 The onus was on the Executive, in the
Country Reports required under section 502B,71 to characterize accu-
rately the human rights record of each country, and to determine
whether a country met the standard imposed by the statute. But the
Executive was anxious not to antagonize "friendly" foreign governments.
As a General Accounting Office (GAO) study prepared for the House
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs stated: "According to sev-
eral State Department officials and documents, neither the Carter nor
Reagan Administrations wished to publicly label any country as a consis-
tent and gross violator of human rights because it would be too difficult
to clear a country of such a label once given."' 72 Nevertheless, officials in
the Carter Administration included Guatemala among the countries that
were "considered to be engaged in gross violations under the statute...
[as] could easily have been inferred from the pattern of decisions on spe-
cific security assistance issues raised in action memorandums, ' 73 Ac-
cording to the GAO report, "direct U.S. military assistance ([Foreign
Military Sales] credits, Military Assistance Program, and International
Military Education and Training funding) was discontinued between fis-
cal years 1978 and 1984, and commercial [arms] sales dropped signifi-
cantly in the late 1970's and early 1980's because of cited human rights
violations." 74 With respect to Guatemala, the Carter Administration's
foreign aid practice was largely consistent with both congressional intent
and the President's stated human rights policy.
While the Carter Administration at least implicitly recognized that
Guatemala was a gross human rights violator, the admission was not
long sustained under the next administration. President Reagan's desire
to supply the Guatemalan military was incompatible with the goals of
section 502B. By urging that improvements in human rights conditions
were sufficient to justify military assistance under the statute, by issuing
70. Indeed, no countries were so designated. See Cohen, supra note 55, at 264; Albert,
supra note 55, at 249 n.120.
71. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b).
72. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 3, 4. The GAO Report incorrectly infers from this
fact that therefore "the U.S. government has not been under any legal requirement to cut off
U.S. arms transfers to [Guatemala]." Id. at 8. The legal requirement, however, stems from
the fact that gross violations of human rights persisted in Guatemala, not from the fact that
the State Department refused to issue a public condemnation. In this regard we agree with
Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs: "[A]s now drafted the
[GAO] report may be read to give the misleading impression that section 502B applies only in
cases where a formal determination has been made that a country is engaged in a 'consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights'." Id., Appendix XI:
Advance Comments from the Department of State, at 36.
73. Cohen, supra note 55, at 269.
74. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
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inaccurate and biased reports, and by evading section 502B's proscrip-
tion of military sales, the President succeeded in undermining congres-
sional intent.
1. "Improvement" as a Predicate for Aid
In July 1982, the Reagan Administration justified a proposed loan to
Guatemala for the installation of a rural telephone system on the grounds
that conditions had so improved in Guatemala that the country no
longer fell within the prohibitions of the human rights statutes. 75 While
the loan itself was not security assistance-it came instead under the do-
main of legislation prohibiting U.S. participation in multilateral develop-
ment bank loans to human rights violators76 -the Executive's rationale
for supporting the loan was broad enough to cut inroads into all the
human rights statutes, including section 502B.
77
In effect, the President was reinterpreting section 502B; mere improve-
ments in a country's human rights practices were tendered as a justifica-
tion for U.S. military assistance. In fact, Guatemala did not qualify for
assistance under the human rights statutes, except where the assistance
clearly fell within one of the statutory exceptions. 78 There is abundant
75. See Letter of Stephen W. Bosworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Dept. of State (July 15, 1982), reprinted in Inter-American Development
Bank Loan to Guatemala: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Development Institutions and
Finance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
134-35 (1982), cited in Albert, supra note 55, at 251 n.134; see also L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1982,
at 9, col. 1 (according to a State Department official, there is "no question" that the previous
government of General Lucas Garcia was "more repressive and corrupt" than the then current
regime of President Rios Montt); L.A. Times, Mar. 12, 1983, at 10, col. 1 ("the Reagan admin-
istration late last year reviewed the civil rights situation here and decided ... that there had
been improvements under the Rios Montt government.").
76. International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 § 701, 22 U.S.C. § 262d (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). The act instructed U.S. representatives in multilateral development banks to
oppose loans to countries with poor human rights records.
The Reagan Administration had sought the telephone system loan in 1981 as well as in
1982, but on different grounds. In 1981 the Administration maintained not that Guatemala
was beyond the reach of the human rights legislation, but rather that the loan was justifiable
under an express exception to the International Financial Institutions Act, "namely, that the
United States could vote for assistance to "programs which serve the basic human needs of the
citizens" of the recipient country, other provisions of the act notwithstanding. 22 U.S.C.
§ 262d(f); see Albert, supra note 55, at 248. The 1981 application was withdrawn after objec-
tions were raised at committee hearings. Id. at 248 n. 117. The 1982 loan, on the other hand,
received a favorable U.S. vote in December 1982. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1983, at Dl, col. 1.
77. For an excellent analysis of this change in approach, see Albert, supra note 55.
78. The most notable are the "needy people" exception of section 116 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (regulating economic and
development assistance), and the "basic human needs" exception of section 701 of the Interna-
tional Financial Institutions Act of 1977, 22 U.S.C. § 262d (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (regulating
U.S. participation in regional development bank loans). According to Paul Albert, prior to
December 1982, "[Ihe Reagan administration did not vote in favor of nonbasic human needs
loans [for Guatemala] at the Inter-American Development Bank, and its requests for economic
125
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evidence that in 1982 the Guatemalan people continued to suffer grievous
abuses of their human rights. As a November 1982 Americas Watch
report summarized, "those who are with the government are fed; those
who are not with the government are shot."'79
Nevertheless, President Reagan continued to press for security assist-
ance to Guatemala. While Congress blocked some of the President's
moves,80 in other cases he was successful, leading one journalist to write
that "[t]he Guatemalan army has suffered little more than political em-
barrassment from the curtailment of open U.S. military aid after 1977."81
Following the 1982 coup which installed General Rios Montt, for exam-
ple, the Reagan Administration approved a cash sale of more than $6
million in spare parts, primarily for helicopters and other aircraft. 82 At
development assistance were limited to aid which clearly fell within the basic human needs
exception." Albert, supra note 55, at 249 (footnotes omitted).
The sole exception contained in section 502B is the exception for "extraordinary circum-
stances... which necessitate a continuation of security assistance, [when] on all the facts it is
in the national interest of the United States to provide such assistance." 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304(c)(1)(C); see supra note 63. This exception was used liberally during the Carter years,
saving many countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia from the § 502B prohibition.
These countries either "supplied a critical resource, shared a border with the Soviets, or acted
as a special surrogate to defend U.S. interests in [an] entire region." Cohen, supra note 55, at
270-71. The exception was not invoked, however, for countries in Latin America, including
Guatemala.
In addition to these exceptions, two separate sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
independently authorize a waiver of human rights restrictions in special circumstances. Section
506 provides that if the President determines and reports to the Congress that "an unforeseen
emergency exists which requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country" and that
"cannot be met under the authority of ... any other law," then "he may direct ... the
drawdown of defense articles.. . , defense services .... and military education and training, of
an aggregate value not to exceed $75,000,000 in any fiscal year." 22 U.S.C. § 2318 (1982 and
Supp. III 1985). Section 614 provides that the President may authorize assistance, or may
make sales, extend credit, and issue guarantees, up to specified limits, without regard to any
other provision of law, if he determines and reports to the Congress 'that to do so is important
to the security interests of the United States," provided that he first "consult with, and...
provide a written policy justification" to designated committees. 22 U.S.C. § 2364 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
79. AMERICAS WATCH COMM., HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA: No NEUTRALS AL-
LOWED 2 (1982); see also AMNESTY INT'L, GUATEMALA: MASSIVE EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECU-
TIONS IN RURAL AREAS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL EFRAIN Rios MONTT
(1982); J. HANDY, supra note 13, at 250-81. Even the Reagan Administration admitted as
much when a new general, Mejia Victores, took over the government in an August 8, 1983
coup. To shed the most favorable light on the new regime, Administration officials empha-
sized purported human rights improvements over the old regime of Rios Montt. See AMERI-
CAS WATCH COMM., GUATEMALA REVISED: How THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FINDS
"IMPROVEMENTS" IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA 14-16 (1985) [hereinafter GUATE-
MALA REVISED]. This pattern of finding improvements with each new general who took
power has characterized the Reagan approach to Guatemala in general.
80. For example, the Administration requested $10 million in Foreign Military Sales cred-
its for Guatemala for fiscal years 1984 and 1985; both requests were turned down by Congress.
GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
81. Nairn, The Guatemala Connection, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1986, at 20, 22.
82. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 4.
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the time, the Guatemalan government lacked the funds for the purchase.
The following year, however, the new government of Mejia Victores
asked to make a reduced purchase, which the Reagan Administration
approved in January 1984.83 Just prior to the sale, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States
(OAS) had presented a report to the OAS General Assembly, concluding
that "there has been no significant improvement of the human rights
situation in Guatemala; ... disappearances, killings, torture, and the ab-
sence of [an] autonomous judicial system capable of insuring fair trials,
render the rights in the American Convention on Human Rights illusory
and are an affront to the conscience of the Americas."
84
2. Biased and Inaccurate Information
A major problem with section 502B, and the foreign assistance appro-
priations process in general, is that although Congress often hears testi-
mony from independent human rights groups, it relies in the first
instance on information provided by the Executive.85 The information is
often not trustworthy. The Executive's findings, contained in the annual
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights, have been criti-
cized by human rights groups for their inaccuracies and their tendency to
reflect the ideological bias of the Administration.8 6 Summarizing their
evaluation of the 1985 Country Reports, the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights and the Watch Committees wrote:
As in the past, probably our strongest criticisms of the U.S. human rights
performance in 1985 focus on El Salvador and Guatemala. Again, our
quarrel with the Administration is in part because it insists that the advent
of elected civilian governments signifies an end to human rights abuses,
whereas we believe that they must also demonstrate that the rule of law
prevails. In addition, we are critical because the Administation continues
to deny widespread gross abuses that we consider to be well-
substantiated.
87
83. Id. The Reagan Administration also succeeded in providing Guatemala with $300,000
in International Military Education and Training (IMET) in 1985, for the first time since 1977,
as well as $10 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) in 1983 and $12.5 million in ESF in
1985. Id. at 29, 30.
84. INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: THE REAGAN REC-
ORD OF DECEIT AND ILLEGALITY ON CENTRAL AMERICA 58 (1985) [hereinafter CONTEMPT
OF CONGRESS].
85. Section 502B directs the Secretary of State to submit reports on human rights condi-
tions in prospective recipient countries. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b).
86. See, eg., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & THE WATCH COMMS., THE REA-
GAN ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1985, at 1-7 (1986) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1985].
87. Id. at 6.
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In stronger language, George McGovern has decried "the constant fudg-
ing, withholding, distorting and downright lying about the facts in Cen-
tral America. '
88
The self-serving character of the Reagan Administration's human
rights reports is especially evident when the reports on Guatemala from
successive years are read in sequence. An Americas Watch Report from
September 1985 concluded:
Reviewing the record, we find that the Reagan Administration failed to
condemn gross violations by Presidents Lucas, Rios, and Mejia while each
in turn held office. Indeed, at times, it praised their performance on human
rights. As soon as a Guatemalan military dictator was deposed, however,
the State Department condemned his human rights record for the purpose
of favorably comparing his successor to what went before.
89
The assessment of a regime's human rights performance fluctuated, de-
pending on whether the Reagan Administration wanted to assist that re-
gime or its successor. Any objectivity in the reports was undermined by
ulterior foreign policy goals,90 thereby subverting the goals of the human
rights statutes.
88. McGovern, Preface to CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS, supra note 84, at 2.
89. GUATEMALA REVISED, supra note 79, at 1.
90. Last year, for example, the Administration pressured Cerezo to renounce his policy of
"active neutrality" toward the U.S.-backed contras in Nicaragua. See AMERICAS WATCH,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA DURING PRESIDENT CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR 81 (1987)
[hereinafter CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR]. The Watch Committees and the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights wrote in early 1987:
It was plain... during 1986 that concern with human rights [in Central America] was
subsidiary to the Administration's main goal--ousting the Sandinista government from
Nicaragua. The preoccupation with this goal by the Administration led it to countenance
many abuses that it might otherwise have opposed effectively: . . .[for example,] the
subversion of civilian authority in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in the effort by
the Administration to enlist the armed forces in those countries in support of its war
against the Sandinistas.
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & THE WATCH COMMS., THE REAGAN ADMINIS-
TRATION'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1986, at 4 (1987) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN
1986].
More broadly, the Administration tends, in Central America as elsewhere, to view regional
and civil conflicts as manifestations of the ideological battle between Communism and the
"Free World." See 2 M. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 13, at 285. At a House Committee on
Foreign Affairs hearing on the ISDCA, Secretary of State George Shultz testified:
While we are promoting democratic reform throughout Central America, the Soviet
Union and Cuba are abetting the establishment of a Communist dictatorship in Nicara-
gua. If the forces of dictatorship continue to feel free to aid and abet insurgencies in the
name of 'proletarian internationalism,' it would be absurd if the democracies felt inhibited
about promoting the cause of democracy.
Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986-1987 (Part I): Hearings before the Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1985); see also Chomsky & Herman, supra note 2,
at 30-31 ("U.S. economic interests in the Third World have dictated a policy of containing
revolution, preserving an open door for U.S. investment, and assuring favorable conditions of
investment.").
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3. Evasions of Section 502Bs Proscription of Military Sales
Congress' intent in section 502B was not merely to ban grants of mili-
tary aid, but also to prohibit government and corporate sales of defense
articles or services. 91 The Reagan Administration evaded these provi-
sions by removing items from lists of materials forbidden for sale to Gua-
temala, even though the items were clearly used for military purposes,
92
and by permitting the shipment of arms to Guatemala by independent
corporate suppliers.93 Section 502B prohibits "the export of defense
articles or defense services to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence,
or other internal security forces of a foreign country under section 38 of
the Arms Export Control Act." 94 The Arms Export Control Act, in
turn, defines "defense articles" and "defense services" broadly to include
support equipment and related services, as well as weapons themselves.95
Specific equipment covered by the act is listed by the Office of Munitions
Control96 in its "Munitions List."
'97
A second list, the Commerce Department's "Crime Control and De-
tection List,"' 98 was brought under the 502B prohibition by the 1978
amendment:99 "Security assistance may not be provided to the police,
domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of a country, and
licenses may not be issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979
for the export of crime control and detection instruments and
equipment. '' to o
Yet, commercial sales made by private U.S. companies were "[tihe pri-
mary means Guatemala used during the period 1978 through 1982 to
obtain military and dual-use equipment and technology from the United
States."101 In certain cases, items shipped to Guatemala for military use
did not appear on either of the prohibited lists. In 1980 and 1981, for
example, 23 Bell Helicopters worth almost $25 million were sold to Gua-
temala, but escaped review because the helicopters were classified as ci-
91. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(2)(B), (C).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 101-106.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 107-110.
94. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(2)(C).
95. 22 U.S.C. § 2794 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
96. The Office of Munitions Control is under joint direction of the Departments of State
and Defense.
97. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1987).
98. 15 C.F.R. § 376.14 (1987).
99. See supra note 62.
100. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2). For a description of the procedures for administrative review
of license applications, see GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 4-5. For lists of items for Guate-
mala either approved, disapproved, or "returned without action" by the Office of Munitions
Control, see id. at 18-23. For similar tables with respect to Department of Commerce action
on license applications, see id. at 24-27.
101. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 4.
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vilian by the Commerce Department. 10 2 These helicopters were used by
the Guatemalan Air Force, with twenty pilots receiving training at Bell's
headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. 10 3 According to one journalist, the
"Guatemalan air force pilots . . . spoke highly of their hands-on U.S.
training and said they left Texas early to rush immediately into rural
operations."' 1 4 By labeling the helicopter transaction "civilian," the Ex-
ecutive evaded the restrictions of 502B.
An even more blatant example was the June 10, 1981 approval of the
sale of $3.1 million worth of military cargo trucks and jeeps to Guate-
mala. The same items had been deleted from the Crime Control and
Detection List one week earlier. 10 5 According to Representative Don
Bonker, former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations,
[R]efugees reported that the Guatemalan soldiers arrived in helicopters,
trucks, and jeeps, and tortured and murdered innocent unarmed civilians,
including an 80 year-old-man [sic] and a 7 year-old girl.... By selling or
giving the Lucas regime helicopter parts, training packages, or jeeps and
trucks; [sic] we are literally aiding the indiscriminate attacks on innocent
peasant villages and households. 10 6
Some shipments of military equipment to Guatemala by private com-
panies evaded the government review process altogether. Leon Kopyt,
the president of Mass Transit Systems Corporation of Philadelphia, told
journalist Allan Nairn that his company had been supplying the Guate-
malan government with laser-aimed rifle sights for several years, in spite
of the fact that an application for the sale of these devices with the Office
of Munitions Control had been "returned without action." 0 7 According
102. Albert, supra note 55, at 249-50; Naim, supra note 81, at 22.
103. Nairn, supra note 81, at 22.
104. Nairn, Letter to the Editor, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1986, at 6, 7 (author's reply)
[hereinafter Nairn Letter].
105. CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS, supra note 84, at 54-56; see also Albert, supra note 55, at
247 n. 105 (items were removed from this list by Commerce Department at suggestion of State
Department after receipt of applications from two companies to export the items to
Guatemala).
106. Human Rights in Guatemala: Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Int'l Organizations
and on InterAmerican Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess 3
(1981) (prepared statement of Don Bonker, Chairman, Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l
Organizations). But cf Implementation of Congressionally Mandated Human Rights Provi-
sions (Vol. 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Organizations of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981) (prepared statement of Wal-
ter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs):
We currently have pending a number of license applications seeking authorization to ex-
port abroad police equipment. I wish to assure the Committee that human rights factors
will be considered in reaching a decision on the ultimate disposition of these licenses and
that these decisions will be in full compliance with the law.
107. Nairn, supra note 81, at 20.
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to Nairn, "Kopyt says Mass Transit obtains the sights overseas... and
therefore does not need a State Department license." 10 8 Richard H. Mel-
ton, former Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian
Affairs of the State Department, denied the existence of this illicit supply
line: "There are no laser-aimed rifle sights in the Guatemalan army." 10 9
Nairn, however, maintains that he confirmed Leon Kopyt's assertions
"with Guatemalan officers, Mass Transit company documents, and
Western intelligence officials." ' 10 The number of other such illicit trans-
fers of military equipment is impossible to determine.
Another means of evading review has involved the use of third coun-
tries. In 1982, ten U.S. M-41 tanks, worth approximately $34 million,
were shipped to Guatemala by a Belgian company by way of the Domini-
can Republic.111 While the State Department denied prior knowledge of
the illegal transfer, 112 Nairn contends that "[a]ccording to U.S. officials,
the Pentagon and the CIA had arranged for the tanks to arrive from
Belgium by way of the Dominican Republic." 113 In any case, three years
later, even after the State Department concededly knew of the deal, no
report had been fied with Congress as required by the Arms Export
Control Act. The GAO Report on Guatemala states:
Evidence indicates that although the need to submit a . . . report on the
Guatemala transfer was discussed within State, the report was delayed until
all investigations could be completed. Apparently, either the investigations
were not completed, were not reported to the State Department, or the De-
partment decided not to prepare the report to Congress. In any event, we
found no evidence of any report ever being submitted to the Congress.'
14
Section 502B promoted a norm-no aid to human rights violators-
that remained distant from and largely irrelevant to the gritty politics of
arms sales. Because of executive evasion of the legislative restrictions,
the "mandatory prohibition" was hardly more effective than the initial
"sense of Congress" resolution.
108. Id.
109. Melton, Letter to the Editor, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1986, at 6.
110. Nairn Letter, supra note 104, at 8.
111. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
112. See id., Appendix XL Advance Comments from the Department of State, at 38.
113. Nairn, supra note 81, at 21.
114. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 7. More generally, the Reagan Administration, like
others before it, has sought the aid of other countries in the service of U.S. foreign policy goals.
Since the curtailment of U.S. military sales, Israel in particular has continued to supply the
Guatemalan military with equipment. Nairn, supra note 81, at 22; Jamail & Gutierrez, Israel
in Central America, REPORT ON GUATEMALA, July-Aug. 1987, at 5.
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III. Country-Specific Legislation and the Certification Process
A. Congressional Intent
In addition to enacting general human fights legislation, Congress be-
gan in the 1970s to condition military assistance to specified countries on
human rights considerations. Some of the enactments were outright
prohibitions; others required that a certification be filed prior to the
disbursement of funds. 115 Altogether approximately twenty countries
have been denied aid through country-specific legislation. 1
6
Country-specific legislation has been viewed as a censure both of the
foreign government and of the U.S. executive branch, inasmuch as the
legislation reflects congressional sentiment that the Executive has not
properly enforced the general human rights statutes with respect to that
particular country. 117 Furthermore,
[t]he repeated willingness of Congress to legislate on specific countries
placed the Executive on notice: unless it began to apply section 502B, Con-
gress might legislate again. While this prospect did not move the Ford and
Nixon administrations to alter their practice, it appears to have had signifi-
cant influence on the Carter administration.
1 8
115. See e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 703, 99 Stat. 190, 239-41 (1985) (country-specific legis-
lation on Guatemala).
116' For a compilation of these statutes, see U.S. LEGISLATION RELATING HUMAN
RIGHTS TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1982) (available from Int'l Human Rights Law Group,
Washington, D.C.).
117. See Comment, supra note 55, at 170 ("[C]ountry-specific legislation represents Con-
gress' attempt to implement its own laws when the Executive has failed to observe them.").
An examination of the context in which certain country-specific statutes were passed, however,
suggests that this interpretation is not universally correct. For example, in 1977 the State
Department published reports critical of human rights conditions in Argentina, Brazil, El Sal-
vador and Guatemala. The countries responded by branding "the American efforts as interfer-
ence in their domestic affairs." L.A. Times, Mar. 18, 1977, at 20, col. 1. The Guatemalan
Foreign Ministry, for example, stated that it "declines in advance whatever aid or sale of
military equipment conditioned on judgments made by whatever foreign government on affairs
that are exclusively of its internal competence." While protection of human rights was a
"laudable desire of the illustrious government of the United States," Guatemala could not
accept "a doctrine in which one government unilaterally takes the right to judge another gov-
ernment with which it has friendly relations .... " Id.
Only at this point did Congress react, imposing a one-year prohibition on military sales
credits. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-148, § 503B, 91 Stat. 1230, 1239 (1977). The Senate Report which discusses the bill states:
"Brazil, El Salvador and Guatemala have informed the United States that they were not inter-
ested in receiving any credits extended by the United States. Therefore, the Committee recom-
mends a reduction in this program reflecting the amounts that would have been available to
those countries under the Administration's request." S. REP. No. 352, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
108 (1977). Thus, in this case, Congress was not censuring the Executive but was merely
reacting to the rejection of U.S. assistance by the four developing countries. Concern for
human rights simply was not the major impetus behind Congress' decision.
118. Cohen, supra note 55, at 256.
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In 1985, Congress sought through country-specific legislation to en-
sure that human rights considerations would play a prominent role in the
Reagan Administration's policy toward post-election Guatemala. 119
Section 703 of the ISDCA 120 prohibited military aid unless (1) "an
elected civilian government [was] in power in Guatemala," and (2) the
"government made demonstrated" progress in alleviating human rights
abuses. 21 The first of these conditions did not by itself undermine the
general 502B prohibition. Indeed, it raised the standard for military aid
by adding the explicit goal of civilian control.
The second condition, on the other hand, significantly weakened the
standard imposed by section 502B. Section 502B contained a blanket
prohibition: It required not just progress, but an actual end to the consis-
tent pattern of gross violations of human rights. 22 Under section 703,
however, the President could legally disburse military assistance to a
country that demonstrated a consistent pattern of human rights abuses,
so long as the pattern was less egregious than in the preceding year.
123
119. Senator Kennedy, proposing an early version of section 703, argued that the United
States should not provide "military aid to the armed forces of [Guatemala] while they continue
to engage in brutal human rights abuses." 131 CONG. REc. S6211 (daily ed. May 15, 1985).
Kennedy believed that the Reagan "administration [had] failed to give adequate consideration
either to human rights in Guatemala or to democracy in Guatemala." Id. While the Senate
rejected Kennedy's proposal, id. at S6212, a virtually identical provision passed the House,
was adopted by conference committee, and was enacted into law. H.R. REP. No. 237, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1985) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference); see
also CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR, supra note 90, at 89-90 ("Anticipating the Reagan Administra-
tion's eagerness to re-establish a military relationship with the Guatemalan armed forces after
the election of a civilian government, Congress attached a series of conditions to legislation
authorizing military aid for Guatemala.").
120. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 703, 99 Stat. at 239-41. Section 703's conditions remained in
force only during the provision's two-year authorization period, which expired on September
30, 1987. During this period, section 703 superseded section 502B with respect to military
assistance to Guatemala. Section 502B's prohibitions, however, are not similarly time-bound;
hence, absent supervening law, section 502B controls. Congress is currently considering an
authorization bill for fiscal years 1988 and 1989. See supra note 21.
121. Id. § 703(a).
122. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
123. In marked contrast, Congress had, only two years prior to enacting Section 703,
amended related human rights legislation to ensure that the criteria for aid would not be di-
luted. Section 701(a)(1) of the International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 262d
(1982), prohibits U.S. support for multilateral loans to countries that engage in "a pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." This provision initially included
the word "consistent" before "pattern," but the word was deleted by amendment. Supplemen-
tal Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 1004, 97 Stat. 1153, 1286 (1983). The
purpose of the deletion clearly was to ensure enforcement of the statute according to congres-
sional intent. The House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs "remind[ed]
those charged with executing this law that the law does not make reference to 'improvement'
and that it is not enough to change the requirement that the United States oppose loans to
particular countries because the kind and scope of violations in such countries have changed if
a pattern of gross violations continues." H.R. REP. No. 175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60,
reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1942-43.
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While promotion of human rights remained the goal, section 703 was a
step backward. 124
B. The Problem of Delegation
Section 703 requires that the President issue a certification to Congress
justifying, under the terms of the statute, the delivery of military assist-
ance to Guatemala. 125 This procedural mechanism guarantees that the
President's findings will be public. Although the provision was designed
to reinforce Congress' ability to ensure that its intent is respected, it has
not succeeded. In fact, section 703 has actually increased congressional
reliance on the Executive's findings.
Like section 502B, section 703 charges the Executive with fact-finding.
The two provisions operate very differently, however. Under 502B, the
State Department is directed to transmit to Congress a "full and com-
plete report" on the human rights practices in prospective recipient coun-
tries "as part of the presentation materials for security assistance
programs proposed for each fiscal year." 126 When Congress subse-
quently authorizes money for security assistance, it may use the Country
Reports as it wishes-relying fully on their authority, supplementing
them with its own findings, or even ignoring them. Its degree of reliance
on the reports is a result of political accommodation, and is in no way
constrained by the Executive's conclusions.
Congress' role vis-i-vis the section 703 certification is different, Unlike
the reporting requirement of section 502B, section 703's certification pro-
vision is self-executing; that is, once the President complies, the authori-
zation of military assistance to Guatemala is a fait accompli.127 Under
section 703, Congress has already acted-to authorize security assistance
124. Cf International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-113, § 728, 95 Stat. 1519, 1555-56, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 note (1982), which required the Presi-
dent to certify that the government of El Salvador was taking steps toward alleviating human
rights abuses in that country. The intent of the legislation was to tighten congressional control
over the Reagan Administration's policy in El Salvador, which had been conducted in viola-
tion of general human rights statutes. See generally Nash, supra note 55, at 280. Yet by
replacing the broader 502B prohibition with the requirement that the Salvadoran government
make "progress" in a few areas, section 728 achieved the opposite result: It authorized the
disbursement of U.S. military aid to a government that engaged in gross violations of human
rights. "Congress' focused attempt to address the Salvadoran problem, therefore, ironically
resulted in exempting El Salvador from the stricter human rights legislation already in force."
Comment, supra note 55, at 175.
125. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 703(a), 99 Stat. at 239-40.
126. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b).
127. Section 703 is part of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985, enacted "[t]o authorize international development and security assistance programs...
for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 ...." Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 703, 99 Stat. at 190 (prefatory
language).
134
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on the condition that it receive a timely Presidential certification-and
that authorization is effective unless Congress repeals it by further legis-
lation. Under LN.S. v. Chadha, Congress may not retain the power to
veto the authorization if it disagrees with the President's decision.
128
Even when the President does issue a section 703 certification, how-
ever, Congress' choice is not irrevocable. Congress must still appropriate
funds to the programs it has authorized, and it could include a country-
specific prohibition in its appropriations bill. To accomplish this,
however, would require a rare degree of political mobilization. Such a
measure would require those who initially supported section 703 to con-
cede, in effect, that the provision had failed in its purpose. Members of
Congress who fought to constrain the President through section 703
would need to convince their colleagues that even stronger constraints
were necessary.
In section 703, therefore, Congress not only weakened the substantive
standard in the human rights statutes, but also created a procedural
mechanism under which its delegation of power to the President is diffi-
cult to check. The Executive exploited these flaws in the certification
that followed, basing its justification for military assistance on a distorted
version of the facts.
C. The June 6, 1986 Certification
On June 6, 1986, pursuant to section 703, Secretary of State George
Shultz transmitted to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs a "Certification to Authorize Military Assistance and Sales for
Guatamala."' 129 The certification asserts that all the conditions specified
in section 703 have been satisfied. A four-page "Justification" for such
assistance accompanied the certification. 130 The image of Guatemala de-
scribed in these documents-an established civilian government enforc-
ing the rule of law, a subservient military, a sharp decline in political
violence, minimal pressure on citizens to join civil defense patrols, and
full support for the domestic human rights group--differs greatly from
the facts documented by independent human rights groups.
128. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
129. Certification to Authorize Military Assistance and Sales for Guatemala, 51 Fed. Reg.
24,467 (1986).
130. Department of State, Justification for Certification to Authorize Military Assistance
and Sales for Guatemala (June 6, 1986) (unpublished, but transmitted to House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs along with Certification to Authorize Military Assistance and Sales for Guate-
mala, supra note 129) [hereinafter Justification] (copy on file with the Yale Journal oflnterna-
tional Law).
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1. Civilian Control
Central to section 703 was the requirement that an elected civilian gov-
ernment attain power in Guatemala. Secretary Shultz stated in the Justi-
fication that the civilian government "took office without interference
from the military establishment .... ,,131 Despite the inauguration of a
civilian president in January 1986, however, there was little doubt that
the military actually controlled Guatemala.
Even the new president of Guatemala acknowledged that the elections
"were not a gracious concession on the part of the military."'1 32 In fact,
the elections were the culmination of a three-stage strategy conceived by
the Army after the Rios Montt coup of March 1982.133 The Army's
strategic retreat from the forefront of the political arena was designed to
improve the regime's image, ensuring needed foreign assistance, loans,
and investment. 134 Although the Guatemalan military retreated from
formal office, it did not relinquish its power. After the elections, Cerezo
admitted that his ability to control the Army would be "dependent on
[his] ability to play by the rules."'135
Under section 703, no military assistance could be provided absent a
formal written request from Cerezo. When he took office, Cerezo an-
nounced that he would delay his request for military assistance for a
131. Id. at 1. Although a civilian government was elected in 1985, some human rights
groups questioned the fairness of the elections. See GUATEMALAN ELECTIONS, supra note 14,
at 62 (concluding that intimidation and threats of violence against parties and voters made a
wholly free and fair election impossible); see also TODAY'S GUATEMALA, supra note 14.
Guatemalans interviewed cited fear of reprisal by the Army as a prominent reason for voting.
According to TODAY'S GUATEMALA, voting is "mandatory" in Guatemala. The Army paid
for advertisements which declared that abstaining or casting blank ballots was treasonous.
132. Black, Cerezo, Guatemala's New Leader, Sees Duarte as an Object Lesson, L.A.
Times, Jan. 12, 1986, § 5, at 2, col. 3.
133. Id. The Army detailed its plan in a document called the "National Plan of Security
and Development," which was approved by Rios Montt in April, 1982. The three stages con-
sisted of: a war to rid Guatemala of "communist subversion"; the creation of a network of
agencies, the rural resettlement program, and civil defense patrols that would secure the
Army's control in the countryside; and "elections with a massive turnout" that would ensure
the foreign aid "which might help Guatemala to defeat subversion." Id.; see also T. BARRY,
supra note 11, at 40; Black, supra note 8, at 11 (describing the four-year master plan as one
that would progress "from scorched earth to clean elections").
134. See Kinzer, Walking the Tightrope in Guatemala, N.Y. Times, Nov. 91 1986, § 6
(Magazine), at 38: "Badly in need of foreign aid and realizing they could no longer avoid the
inevitable, the officers allowed a free election-and a historic adversary of the military assumed
the presidency." Kinzer quotes a top Guatemalan Army officer who boasted, "Vinicio is a
project of ours-not Vinicio himself, but the return of civilian institutions .... This civilian
project is really a military project. We can defend the country better this way. That's why we
were the first to press for elections, and that's why we want this project to succeed." Id.
135. Central American Historical Institute, UPDATE, Mar. 31, 1986, at 5 (citation omit-
ted). In October 1985, Cerezo admitted, "In the first six months I'll have 30% of the power.
In the first two years I'll have 50%, and I'll never have more than 70% of the power during
my five-year term." The 70% Solution, TIME, Nov. 18, 1985, at 60.
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year. 136 In response to pressure from the Guatemalan military, however,
Cerezo submitted a request for U.S. assistance in May 1986, only four
months later. 137
As evidence that the Guatemalan government is achieving control
over the military, the State Department points to Cerezo's abolition of
the Department of Technical Investigations (DIT). 138 The DIT was a
civilian group that abducted and killed Guatemalan citizens on orders
from the Army. 139 Unfortunately, the dissolution of the DIT proves lit-
tle about Cerezo's gain of control over the military. Indeed, this was the
third time during the past six Guatemalan regimes that the DIT had
been purged."40 More important, the government left intact the army
intelligence unit that directed the DIT.
141
Cerezo's lack of power is further demonstrated by his inability to pur-
sue those responsible for political violence. Under the decree issued by
General Mejia Victores four days before Cerezo took office, the president
was forbidden to prosecute military or police personnel for political
crimes committed in the four years preceding that date. 142 Although
136. Guatemala Leader: Don't Start Military Aid Yet, Miami Herald, Dec. 18, 1985, at
A20, col. 1. At that time Cerezo acknowledged that he could not refuse altogether to request
aid "because the Guatemalan military only agreed to give us the office and not full control."
Id.
137. Cerezo's original request was for less than one million dollars. Guatemala President
Requests U.S. Funds, Miami Herald, May 22, 1986, at A28, col. 3. The Reagan Administra-
tion assured Congress that Cerezo requested $5 million, and announced that the U.S. would
provide the larger amount. However, because of U.S. budget cuts, Guatemala actually re-
ceived a little more than $2 million in military aid. CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR, supra note 90, at
90. The Reagan Administration may have urged the Guatemalan military to push Cerezo to
request larger amounts, in spite of his desire to receive aid in small increments in response to
human rights improvements. HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1986, supra note 90, at 66.
138. Justification, supra note 130, at 2.
139. TODAY's GUATEMALA, supra note 14.
140. Nairn & Simon, Bureaucracy of Death, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 30, 1986, at 14.
General Mejia Victores, the military leader whom Cerezo replaced, stated that he had no
objection to the DIT's abolition. In fact, he helped to enforce the disbanding of the DIT with
another government security force, the Special Operations Brigade (BROE), also notorious for
political terror. The BROE detained 600 DIT agents for 24 hours. As a result of Cerezo's
action, 115 agents were fired, and the rest were given an opportunity to join the uniformed
police. UPDATE, supra note 135, at 2. After the DIT was "abolished," a new detective
branch, the Policia de Investigaci6n Criminal (PIC) was established. Id. In Guatemala, the
Group for Mutual Support pointed to the dissolution of the DIT as a "mockery of the people"
and a "mask used to ameliorate Guatemala's deteriorated image caused by governments with
their disappearances, assassinations, massacres . . ." Americas Watch Committee, GUATE-
MALA NEWS IN BRIEF, July 1986, at 5 (citation omitted).
141. Known as the "G-2," this unit is primarily responsible for urban terror. See TODAY'S
GUATEMALA, supra note 14; see also Nairn & Simon, supra note 140, at 15 (describing the G-
2 units on military bases as offices whose function is "the elimination of individuals"). The G-
2 officers both approve killings and make recommendations on potential targets of assassina-
tion to the G-2 control center at the National Palace. Id.
142. Mejia Victores had declared "general amnesty for every person responsible for or
accused of having committed political crimes and related common crimes" from March 23,
1982, the date of the coup that brought Rios Montt to power, to January 14, 1986. All govern-
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Cerezo initially stated that an amnesty would be a matter for the
courts, 14 3 on January 24, 1986, Cerezo announced that the amnesty
would be respected. 144
Cerezo's action angered members of the only human rights organiza-
tion in Guatemala, the Group for Mutual Support (GAM).145 With al-
most 1500 members, GAM has documented 959 cases of
"disappearances" from 1980 to 1985 along with the names of approxi-
mately 100 military and police officials who were allegedly involved.146
The State Department implies that Cerezo has been fully supportive of
GAM. 147 GAM members, however, frustrated in their demands that
Cerezo investigate the disappearances of their relatives and prosecute
those responsible for their deaths, have expressed extreme disappoint-
ment with Cerezo's response. 148
2. Progress in Eliminating Abuses by the Military
As evidence that the government has made progress in eliminating
kidnappings and disappearances, the certification declares that the level
of political violence declined during the previous year, and has dropped
ment officials were included in the amnesty. UPDATE, supra note 135, at 2. An earlier am-
nesty decreed by the Rios Montt government gave the Army protection from prosecution for
earlier crimes. CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR, supra note 90, at 14.
143. CEREZo's FIRST YEAR, supra note 90, at 15.
144. UPDATE, supra note 135, at 2. In an interview, Cerezo stated, "Alfonsin-style trials
would be very difficult here, because the Guatemalan Army is not an army in defeat like in
Argentina. The Guatemalan Army feels that it is victorious and it's right-no matter what the
cost.... [I]f we want to bring about peace in Guatemala, we can't have an amnesty for the
guerillas and put the officers on trial. If I did that I'd be committing suicide." Black, supra
note 8, at 25.
145. Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo por Aparecimiento con Vida de Nuestros Familiares (Group
for Mutual Support for the Appearance Alive of our Families).
146. UPDATE, supra note 135, at 3.
147. "President Cerezo has met several times with relatives of several hundred disappeared
persons, ordering the creation of an independent commission .... " Justification, supra note
130, at 3.
148. Cerezo offered to declare missing persons "deceased" so that widows could collect
social security and so that children could leave the country with the signature of only one
parent on their passports. This action, which would not affect most Guatemalans, who neither
receive social security nor use passports, was rejected as "insulting" by GAM director, Nineth
de Garcia. UPDATE, supra note 135, at 3. Cerezo also promised to set up an investigative
commission to discover the fate of persons "disappeared" under past administrations. In June
1986, Cerezo cancelled his search for an Investigatory Commission; in late December, how-
ever, he promised that such a Commission would be formed in 1987. Americas Watch Com-
mittee, GUATEMALA NEWS IN BRIEF, Dec. 1986-Jan. 1987, at 7. Although a Commission
was formed on April 7, 1987, as of October 1987, only two of the four planned members had
been appointed. REPORT ON GUATEMALA, Sept.- Oct. 1987, at 11. In November 1986, when
the Guatemalan Congress provided for the creation of a human rights procurator, Cerezo
attempted unsuccessfully to veto the bill. CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR, supra note 90, at 9. In
August 1987, a procurator was finally appointed. REPORT ON GUATEMALA, Sept.-Oct. 1987,
at 13.
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sharply since 1982, the government's "peak year for violence." 149
Although the number of murders cited in the 1986 certification-"col-
lected from all available credible sources by the American Embassy in
Guatemala" 150-differ markedly from those documented by human
rights groups and professional journalists, even the Reagan Administra-
tion admits that political murders, abductions, and disappearances con-
tinue to occur.151 Cerezo himself reported an upsurge in political
killings, noting that 69 cadavers, many showing signs of torture, had ap-
peared during his first three weeks in office. 15
2
Even if the statistics relied on by the Executive were accurate, the use
of "progress" as a basis for the provision of assistance guts the law of its
humanitarian objectives. Levels of violence have always fluctuated,
under even the most brutal military regimes in Guatemala. 153 A relative
decline in murders or disappearances in any year, when the underlying
system remains unchanged, should not by itself justify U.S. assistance.
The Administration's statistics, moreover, are in dispute.154 An Amer-
icas Watch publication declared that "[d]espite improvements that have
taken place during President Cerezo's first year, the human rights situa-
tion in Guatemala remains terrible."' 1 5 Nevertheless, the State Depart-
ment persists in finding "noticeable changes" and "dramatic
improvements" in the human rights situation in Guatemala.156 Both the
149. Justification, supra note 130, at 2-3.
150. Id. at 3.
151. The State Department claims there was an average of 10-12 politically-motivated kill-
ings per month since the inauguration. Id.; cf. Nairn & Simon, supra note 140, at 13 (estimat-
ing for the first half of 1986 more than 60 killings per month not attributable to combat or
common crime); CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR, supra note 90 at 30-31 (reporting that after midyear,
the average number of deaths and abductions cited in newspapers rose from 100 to 160 per
month, while the National Police estimated 180 per month).
152. Nairn & Simon, supra note 140, at 13.
153. See generally J. HANDY, supra note 13.
154. See supra note 151.
155. CEREZO'S FIRsT YEAR, supra note 90, at 2. The decline in the level of violence may
be explained in part by the Army's decimation of the guerilla forces, as well as by its success in
engendering fear in rural Guatemala. Recent reports have confirmed that there has been no
significant improvement in human rights conditions in Guatemala since the certification was
issued. See, e.g., Americas Watch Committee, GUATEMALA NEWS IN BRIEF, June 1987, at 2
(noting that the Army's presence and counterinsurgency operations in the countryside have
not diminished since President Cerezo took office); Farnsworth, Guatemala: Who Calls the
Shots?, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 1987, at 16 (describing continued fear of retribution by death
squads).
156. Telephone interview with James Cason, former Guatemala Desk Officer at the State
Dep't (Nov. 5, 1986). Cason stated that "things have improved dramatically this year," and
declared that it is safe for Indians to go home now, because "the violence levels are way
down." This optimism is not shared by Guatemalan refugees. On August 10, 1986, we inter-
viewed a Guatemalan family living in "sanctuary" in New England. They had fled from Gua-
temala during the Mejia Victores regime, after receiving anonymous threats for refusing to
participate in the civil defense patrols. Despite the change in government, they continue to
fear they will be murdered if they return to Guatemala.
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State Department and President Cerezo have tried to explain the level of
violence in Guatemala as resulting from a rise in "common crime" rather
than from political terror.157 Bodies found last year, however, bore signs
of torture.1
58
Military-sponsored violence included intimidation and attacks against
members of the Group for Mutual Support.' 59 In 1985, two of the
Group's six steering committee members were kidnapped, tortured, and
assassinated by security agents. In response to this episode, Congress
added a "sense of the Congress" provision to the ISDCA, requesting pro-
tection for GAM members. 160 The State Department mirrors the lan-
guage of this provision, asserting that GAM "was able to carry out its
work with the full cooperation, protection and support of the Guatema-
lan government." 161 The truth was less appealing: The Army persisted
in intimidating GAM members, who received little support from the ci-
vilian government. 162
157. In fact, the former Guatemalan Desk Officer claimed that under Cerezo there has not
been one "hard case of political violence"! Telephone interview with James Cason, former
Guatemala Desk Officer at the State Dep't (Nov. 5, 1986); see also DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1986: REPORT SUBMITrED TO THE
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 510 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) (minimizing the number of political
killings attributable to the security forces).
158. CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR, supra note 90, at 29-38; Central American Historical Insti-
tute, UPDATE, Sept. 30, 1986, at 1.
159. AMERICAS WATCH COMM., GUATEMALA: THE GROUP FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT 2
(1985). The organization and its members have been threatened numerous times since its for-
mation in 1984. Until recently, it has been too dangerous for any human rights monitoring
group to operate within the country. Even the International Red Cross (IRC), which limits
itself to humanitarian work and declines to disclose information on human rights abuses, has
been barred from Guatemala. Id. at 4. The Justification states that Cerezo has met with the
IRC to discuss "possible humanitarian work" in Guatemala. Justification, supra note 130, at
3. As of February 1987, this goal had not been realized. CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR, supra note
90, at 27.
160. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 703(h)(2), 99 Stat. at 241:
It is the sense of the Congress that-(A) human rights groups in Guatemala, particularly
the Group for Mutual Support, should be allowed to carry out their work against human
rights abuses with the full cooperation, protection, and support of the Government of
Guatemala; and (B) whether the Government of Guatemala allows human rights groups,
including the Group for Mutual Support, to carry out their work should be taken into
account by the United States in determining whether there is human rights progress in
Guatemala.
See also 131 CONG. REC. H5403 (daily ed. July 10, 1985) (statement of Rep. Levine) (praising
the "dignified and important efforts of the group for mutual support in the face of intolerable
government abuses").
161. Justification, supra note 130, at 3.
162. On September 18, 1986, for example, the Guatemalan Army's television channel
showed a photo of Nineth de Garcia, the director of the GAM, with a caption entitled "terror-
ist person." The last time the Army had used this label was in March 1985, when two GAM
leaders were murdered. UPDATE, supra note 158, at 1. Cerezo expressed "surprise" at
GAM's claim that the Army is threatening its members. He promised to investigate its claims
140
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Under section 703, the government must also make progress toward
eliminating forced recruitment into the civil defense patrols. The State
Department claims that "[t]here is no evidence that the Guatemalan gov-
ernment is forcibly conscripting persons into the patrols or holding them
there against their will."163 In truth, however, the civil patrol system is
based entirely on coercion. A centerpiece of the Army's counterin-
surgency strategy, the system is designed to secure control over citizens,
not to grant them autonomy.
Over 900,000 primarily rural citizens currently participate in the pa-
trols. 164 Under the civil patrol system, civilians must stand guard over
their own neighbors, defend the country from "insurgents," and turn in
"suspicious" friends. In this way, the Army divides the population, de-
priving the insurgents of civilian support.165 Forced labor and daily as-
semblies in which villagers pledge allegiance to the military authorities
have become central features of village life. In addition, a "Food for
and to give Garcia a "report." Americas Watch Committee, GUATEMALA NEWS IN BRIEF,
Aug. 1986, at 7.
163. Justification, supra note 130, at 4.
164. TODAY'S GUATEMALA, supra note 14, at 3. The Army has also resettled more than
60,000 civilians into approximately 56 Army-run "model villages" grouped into several "de-
velopment poles" in areas of high conflict. Id. There is no sign that Cerezo is dismantling this
element of Army control. In fact, new "development poles" continue to be established under
Cerezo. UPDATE, supra note 135, at 4. Congressional sentiment against the "model village"
program was so strong that section 703 expressly prohibited development aid and economic
support funds for use in Guatemala's rural resettlement program. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 703(e),
99 Stat. at 240. A State Department official denied that funds disbursed pursuant to Section
703 have been used in this way. Telephone interview with James Cason, former Guatemala
Desk Officer at the State Dep't (May 28, 1987). In a more recent appropriations bill, Congress
passed a provision allowing funds to be used in Guatemala's resettlement program only if the
Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress are notified fifteen days in advance.
Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 101(f), 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-232 (1986). Although funds may now be
legally disbursed for use in the rural resettlement program, Agency for International Develop-
ment (A.I.D.) Desk Officer for Guatemala and Panama, Tom Cornell, insisted that the agency
has so far chosen not to channel U.S. assistance to villages in the development poles. Tele-
phone interview with Tom Cornell (Nov. 13, 1987). In the past, however, after similar denials,
A.I.D. has been forced to admit that funds have in fact gone directly to the model villages. See
T. BARRY, supra note 11, at 43. Barry describes a series of A.I.D. communications from 1982
to 1985 which vigorously denied that funds were going to development poles or model villages.
He then reprints a segment of a 1985 letter from A.I.D. to Senator Patrick Leahy, admitting
that the funds may in fact have gone to such projects, and proposing a program to fund the
local Inter-Institutional Coordination Councils within the development poles.
165. This system disproportionately affects the indigenous Indian population, who reside
in the areas of heaviest conflict. Civil patrols are used by the Army to divide the Indian
highland communities, pitting Indians against their neighbors and even forcing them to kill
their own family members. See 2 M. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 13, at 255. As a result of the
Army's counterinsurgency campaign, their lives have been uprooted and their traditions de-
stroyed. Congress expressed concern for the plight of the Indians in Section 703, requiring the
certification of progress in respecting the internationally recognized human rights of the indig-
enous Indian population. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 703(a)(2)(C), 99 Stat. at 240.
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Work" program reinforces the notion that the Army provides for villag-
ers, while the "subversives" threaten them.166
As stated in the certification, the 1984 Guatemalan Constitution
makes participation in civil patrols voluntary. 167 Although Cerezo prom-
ised to let each village decide whether to participate in civil patrols, the
scenario is highly unrealistic. The two previous regimes of Mejia
Victores and Rios Montt also insisted on the "voluntary nature" of the
patrols,168 but the intimidation inherent in the civil patrol system gives
villagers little freedom to oppose it.169 To recruit patrollers, the Army
goes from house to house, rounding up men for duty.170 Anyone who
refuses to join is labeled "delinquent"; many are tortured or killed, and
fathers are sometimes threatened with the rape of their daughters if they
choose not to join the patrols. 171
Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the State Department
asserts that the civil defense patrols are voluntary. The Justification de-
scribes a case where a village voted to stop participating, but then peti-
tioned the government to reinstate the patrols. 172 It does not explain
why the villagers chose this route, but adds that "undoubtedly many pa-
trol members believe itprudent to participate in village patrols because of
peer pressure."173 This euphemistic language makes a mockery of the
deadly threats faced by the Guatemalan people.
In sum, the Administration found "substantial improvement"'' 74 in a
country still torn by military-sponsored violence. While some progress
could be documented, human rights conditions in Guatemala remained
abysmal. The certification overstated the power of the civilian govern-
ment, applauded cosmetic shifts in policy, and characterized as
''voluntary" one of the most coercive institutions maintained by the
166. Black, supra note 8, at 22. Violence against civilians is often followed by community
assistance-designed by the Army to pacify the resistance. In 1982, the Army conducted such
a pacification campaign, known as "Fusiles y Frijoles" ("Bullets and Beans"). Id. at 11-12.
167. Justification, supra note 130, at 3. However, Cerezo admitted to Americas Watch in
February 1985 that less than one-third of the civil patrollers served voluntarily. CIVIL PA-
TROLS IN GUATEMALA, supra note 8, at 33.
168. In its 1982 and 1983 Country Reports the State Department echoed the claim that the
civil patrols were voluntary. CIVIL PATROLS IN GUATEMALA, supra note 8, at 33. However
in its 1985 report, the State Department acknowledged that they were compulsory in many
rural areas. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1985: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE
HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 547 (Joint Comm. Print 1986).
169. CIVIL PATROLS IN GUATEMALA, supra note 8, at 33.
170. Id. at 39.
171. Id. at 35-40. The Army has also been known to create incidents to convince villagers
that they need a civil patrol. CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR, supra note 90, at 48.
172. Justification, supra note 130, at 4.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 2.
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Guatemalan military. The Executive thereby frustrated Congress' pri-
mary goals, and facilitated the flow of U.S. military assistance into the
hands of human rights violators.175
Conclusion
Neither the general statute prohibiting security assistance to serious
human rights violators nor the country-specific statute have prevented
the flow of U.S. aid to abusive regimes in Guatemala. The Reagan Ad-
ministration evaded the proscription of section 502B by urging that "im-
provement" in the human rights record of successive Guatemalan
regimes would suffice as a condition for aid; by deceptive, inaccurate and
ideologically-motivated reporting; by removing, at opportune moments,
certain items from lists of goods forbidden for sale to Guatemala; and by
refusing to report sales by U.S. allies of U.S.-made weapons to
Guatemala.
The Reagan Administration continued to push for military assistance
to Guatemala after the election of Vinicio Cerezo. While satisfying the
procedural requirement of the 1985 act, the Executive Branch under-
mined congressional intent by submitting a certification that falsely por-
trayed Guatemala as a civilian democracy. But Congress too is
responsible for this outcome. It enacted section 703 with two critical
flaws: The legislation weakened the substantive requirement for the dis-
bursement of security assistance to Guatemala, and it made congres-
sional control over executive policy more difficult.
A serious human rights policy should not accord great weight to "pro-
gress" or "improvements" when gross violations of human rights con-
tinue to dominate the life of a nation. Tailoring aid to progress may in
theory be desirable, but to be successful such a program must be sensitive
to actual conditions in Guatemala and free from underlying institutional
pressure to increase aid. Neither condition is satisfied today. Given
President Reagan's demonstrated willingness to disregard human rights
laws 176 and his overriding anti-Communism, 177 he cannot be trusted to
175. In addition, the United States has directly intervened in the Guatemalan Army's
counterinsurgency war on at least one occasion. According to a Pentagon release issued on
May 5, 1987, U.S. pilots flying U.S. Army helicopters transported 300 Guatemalan counterin-
surgency troops to an area of guerilla activity in early May, 1987. See Stix, U.S. Helicopters
Airlift Guatemalan Combat Troops, REPORT ON GUATEMALA, May-June 1987, at 4; Americas
Watch Committee, GUATEMALA NEWS IN BRIEF, Apr.-May 1987, at 9. The Pentagon stated
that Cerezo had made a request for the helicopters, while other sources report that Defense
Minister General Gramajo initiated this request. An official Guatemalan Army statement on
May 8 declared that the helicopters were "solicited by the Guatemalan army to transport
troop replacements to zones with difficult land access." Id. (emphasis added).
176. See supra Part II.
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report objectively. The concept of progress is too manipulable to serve
Congress' goal.
In addition, by allowing the President to designate authorized funds
for Guatemala provided that he submit a certification, section 703 dele-
gated a power to the President that is difficult to insulate from abuse.
Nevertheless, Congress is not powerless. While unlikely to persuade the
judiciary to hear a challenge to executive authority,17 8 Congress has the
power, both constitutional and political, to govern the appropriations
process in foreign affairs. Most important, it can enact new legislation
cutting off military appropriations to Guatemala. Members of Congress
can also apply political pressure short of legislation. Congressional op-
position-expressed in committee, in floor debate, in sense of Congress
resolutions, even in private communications-can be effective in blocking
the Executive's agenda.179
To overcome the problem of delegation, Congress should enact legisla-
tion that includes procedures more likely to preserve congressional con-
trol. For example, Congress could require that executive certifications of
human rights conditions in Guatemala be approved by joint resolution.
While potentially cumbersome, a promise of expedited, or "fast-track,"
review of the certification would assure a relatively quick congressional
response to executive policy. 180 Moreover, Congress should base its re-
sponse on an independent investigation as well as on the executive certifi-
cation. It could, for example, create a fact-finding commission that
would issue an alternate report. 18' Under such a statute, Congress' fail-
ure to pass a joint resolution within a specified waiting period would
negate the certification-in effect, it would constitute a country-specific
prohibition.
Congress has yet to demonstrate the political will to take any of these
actions. It has failed to voice opposition to the State Department certifi-
177. See supra note 90.
178. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1985, supra note 86, at 64 (Reagan's request for
reprogramming of A.I.D. funds to support Guatemalan model village program withdrawn
because of congressional opposition).
180. Cf Continuing Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat.
1837, 1936 (1984) (conditioning assistance to Nicaraguan contras upon executive reports and
congressional approval by joint resolution). See generally Franck & Bob, supra note 42 (as-
sessing congressional control devices in the post-Chadha era).
181. Cf Int'l Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 99-
500, § 101(k), 100 Stat. 1783-305, 1783-306 (1987) (creating independent five-person commis-
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cation for aid to Guatemala. 182 Perhaps because the inauguration of a
civilian president in a country long ruled by military leaders held such
promise, Congress was willing to tolerate the abuses which continued to
oppress the people of Guatemala. In our view, this represents both the
success of the Guatemalan Army's 1982 plan,183 and a retreat from Con-
gress' concern for human rights articulated a decade ago.
182. According to staff members of the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, strong
bipartisan support for the Cerezo government made significant political challenge to the 1986
certification impossible. Telephone interviews with staff members (Aug. 21 & Nov. 3, 1986).
183. See supra note 133.
